With passage of the Affordable Care Act, the ever-evolving landscape of health care braces for another shift in the reimbursement paradigm. As health care costs continue to rise, providers are pressed to deliver efficient, high-quality care at flat to minimally increasing rates. Inherent systemwide inefficiencies between payers and providers at various clinical settings pose a daunting task for enhancing collaboration and care coordination. A change from Medicare's feefor-service reimbursement model to bundled payments offers one avenue for resolution. Pilots using such payment models have realized varying degrees of success, leading to the development and upcoming implementation of a bundled payment initiative led by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation. Delivery integration is critical to ensure high-quality care at affordable costs across the system. Providers and payers able to adapt to the newly proposed models of payment will benefit from achieving cost reductions and improved patient outcomes and realize a competitive advantage.
Spiraling costs and national economic strains have led inevitably to health care delivery and payment reform. The current US health care system promotes poor quality and inefficiency at a high cost through its fragmented framework. An Institute of Medicine report, Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century, urged the integration of health care delivery across providers and care settings to improve quality outcomes, provide smooth care transitions, and reduce the potential for medical errors. 1 Since the 2001 report, progress has been languid, which is largely attributable to a lack in payment system modification, failing to align both incentives and care coordination. 2 The current Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) reimbursement model supports growth in volume rather than value and quality of outcomes. 3 Misaligned incentives further inhibit collaboration and coordination between providers as well as payers. A need for restructuring is apparent, given increased health care expenditures and reduced reimbursement rates.
In response to changing consumer demands and a shift to provide better value, the newly passed legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, targets the discontinuity by means of establishing financial incentives for providers. A bundled payment initiative will be launched through the recently formed Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation. 4 The pilot program is scheduled to begin in January 2013 and will run for 5 years. 5 Alignment and leadership of physicians and hospitals is critical for success.
Medicare bundled payments are assembled through an episode of care, resulting in a single price for all services required during a patient's entire stay. 6 Shared risk in the model promotes collaboration because both physicians and hospitals stand to lose dollars for poor performance but also to gain dollars for effective and efficient care. Pilots will isolate targeted populations (by procedure or disease), and as such, providers will face the challenge of operating within 2 separate reimbursement constructs that require different business models to support. 7 To compound the issue further, costs are driven by 5 principle components that are affected differently based on payment schemas: prevalence of health condition, number of "episodes of care" per condition, types of services received during the episode, number of resources (eg, drugs and supplies consumed during the episode), and the prices of those resources. 8 
Traditional Payment Model: Fee for Service
Economic risk has not played a significant role in provider practices under the traditional Medicare payment system. 7 Driven by volume, not value, the result is overtreatment and overuse of potentially unneeded services and interventions. Payment models used by Medicare and other payers have evolved over the years in direct response to growing expenditures and poor outcomes. The Social Security Amendments of 1983 introduced the inpatient prospective payment system, which categorized more than 500 diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), each with its own rate, shifting hospital inpatient payments from paying a limitless number of services during the stay to the hospitalization episode in place. 8 This was an advancement that placed more responsibility on provider efficiency and appropriate utilization. In 1984, Medicare moved to the DRG model, stabilizing costs through reductions in length of stay and resource consumption. 9 Though the transition in payment systems occurred on the inpatient side, postacute settings continued to reap the benefits of charging per service rendered. The consequence was a surge in postacute spending in the early 1990s as hospitals sought to discharge patients expeditiously. 8 Post-acute care providers eventually transitioned to the prospective payment system, driven by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. 8 Medicare's FFS model inherently limits collaboration and coordination of all stakeholders. In an effort to share more risk between providers and payers, capitation models began to arise. Under the capitation model, providers (or groups of providers) receive a single payment to cover all services needed for a patient for a period of time, creating an opportunity for cost savings or overspending. 8 Sharing the risk with payers forces providers to economize care, distributing it more judiciously. 9 In an effort to catalyze industry-wide change, bundled payments represent an evolution in risk-based payment systems.
Bundled Payments
Within the present hospital environment, payments made to the institution and physicians are separate. Some services are paid in a bundle form: DRGs bundled for inpatient services, Ambulatory Payment Classifications for outpatient services, and various services rendered during physician office visits. 6 The premise for change is the need for extended accountability from inpatient through postacute care. An episode-of-care payment system aims to capture the entire patient care process.
The equation below depicts the general bundled payment formula:
where A represents hospital payments (Part A), B represents physician payments (Part B-eg, B1, B2, B3), and X represents a negotiated reimbursement price reduction for implementing the bundled payment program, which should enhance efficiency and lower overall costs. 9 Savings allocation will be the responsibility of the contracting organization-in most cases, a hospital or health system. 6 The percentage or portion of shared savings distributed among providers will vary based on negotiations between stakeholders.
National Pilot Program
As part of the Affordable Care Act, a mandated pilot program, commencing in January 2013, will apply a bundled payment model to care providers. Within the program, providers will be paid based on continuity of care, including coordination and transitions, as well as medication reconciliation. 8 The targeted pilot population is all Medicare FFS beneficiaries who have Part A (hospital) and Part B (physician) coverage. 10 Limitations are set on the potential financial gains realized. Participation in the pilot does not imply better reimbursement rates. Benefits will result from improved coordination, leading to decreased service utilization and supply cost, efficient processes, and potential increase in volume. 6 Table 1 depicts 3 hypothetical scenarios in which a pilot participant receives a bundled payment.
As demonstrated in the figure, failure to achieve cost savings through efficiency (scenario 1) can lead to a net loss. The 3 routes demonstrate the risk providers face because profit is not guaranteed. Providers can identify the Medicare Severity DRGs (MS-DRGs) to apply, defining the time period of the episode of care 11 and determining which services should be provided within that encounter. 8 Negotiating bundle prices is a critical element apparent in Table 1 . Competitive pricing ensures savings opportunities. The payment rate is based on historical service use and cost patterns. 12 In addition to the payment calculation, shared savings must be taken into consideration. Participating pilot programs will be responsible for accountability for cost and quality and providing a structure to allocate savings and coordinate care. 6 Success is not assured; however, demonstrations have proven that opportunities exist. A heart bypass surgery bundle demonstration saved Medicare more than $40 million (10% of expected costs) and led to reduced inhospital mortality. 5 Selecting the appropriate MS-DRG and bundled payment model will be essential in positioning providers to succeed in reducing costs and sharing gains.
Models of Care
Four models are available, offering retrospective or prospective payments. 10 Three models involve retrospective bundling, and the fourth arranges payments on a prospective basis. 13 
Retrospective Payments
Retrospective payment bundling consists of a negotiated set target payment that defines the selected episode of care, along with a proposed target price, and discounts reimbursement based on historical cost data. 11 Three different models use this format across various care settings. Providers are paid at the discount price under the FFS model; however, the total payments are compared to the target price, resulting in shared savings or overages.
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Model 1: Medicare pays acute care hospitals under the Inpatient Prospective Payment System less a predetermined discount, whereas physician payments are unchanged. 10 This applies to all MS-DRGs.
Model 2: The episode of care in model 2 includes hospitalization and the postdischarge period (30 or 90 days).
Providers are still paid within the FFS system; however, final episode-of-care costs are compared with the negotiated target price, with any favorable difference being awarded to the providers. 10 The extension beyond an inpatient stay requires acute/postacute coordination and collaboration to effectively manage the patient's condition.
Model 3:
The third retrospective payment system emphasizes the postacute care setting, from the point of discharge to no sooner than 30 days post discharge. 13 Similar to model 2, providers are paid with the FFS system, which includes readmissions, drug costs, and other necessary equipment at a discounted rate. 11 On final payment, variance against target price determines provider loss or gain for the episode.
Prospective Payments
Model 4: Designed to provide a single, prospective (predetermined) bundled payment to the hospital, this approach encompasses all services (including physicians). 11 Funds are allocated as contracted. Medicare Part A and Part B are included in this model, as is a risk threshold that captures the period 30 days post discharge. 10 This model promotes inpatient coordination between practitioners as a result of aligning payment incentives. 
Bundled Payment Pilots
Consideration of prior bundling approaches highlights the potential savings from and challenges to implementing the payment system. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services utilized Center of Excellence demonstrations in 1991, 1996, and 2001 to test opportunities in reform. 9 Predating these demonstrations, during a 1984 initiative at the Texas Heart Institute, physicians targeted bundled payments for coronary artery bypass graft surgery, resulting in a 13% reduction in Medicare payments by 1987. 8 Through 1991 to 1994, a total of 7 hospitals participated in a Heart Bypass Demonstration, during which providers (both hospital and physicians) received a global payment for 2 DRGs (106 and 107). 6 Reductions in length of stay, supply cost, and care variation produced a 10% to 37% decrease in Medicare payments. 8 The positive outcomes of this initiative have spurred subsequent attempts to replicate the findings. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission recommended the initiation of an Acute Care Episode demonstration in 2009, 9 following a 2006 Geisinger initiative known as ProvenCare, which had a focus on coronary bypass surgery. Similar to the Heart Bypass Demonstration and ProvenCare, the 3-year Acute Care Episode initiative focuses on cardiovascular procedures and also added orthopedic practices. 9 The Health Care Incentives Improvement Institute is leading a comprehensive pilot project called PRO-METHEUS (Provider Payment Reform for Outcomes, Margins, Evidence, Transparency, Hassle Reduction, Excellence, Understandability, and Sustainability). 12 The pilot's aim is to test refined payment constructs and assess their applicability in the real world. Cost savings will result through shifting technical risk of care provision to clinical providers and the systems of care that providers use.
In all, 13 bundles were identified: 6 chronic medical conditions, 4 surgical procedures, and 3 acute medical conditions. 12 Incorporation of bundles through pilot sites varied depending on myriad factors. Despite selection, no site has been able to operate the PROMETHEUS payment method because of many barriers and challenges between and among providers and payers. Inherent challenges exist in the use of 2 divisive payment systems (ie, FFS vs episode of care). As of May 2011, sites have not finalized specific payment incentives, citing issues with shared savings, market competition, and the implementation time line.
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Implications and Challenges Ahead
As evidenced by the range of successes and shortcomings of bundled payment pilots, implementation is difficult, and financial gains may be elusive. Through current research and historical experiences from initiatives, 8 main issues come to light.
Physician Alignment and Leadership
Consistent with any successful hospital initiative, physician buy-in and leadership is essential. Financial incentives serve as the means to accomplish alignment between providers. As described earlier, the fragmented delivery system is a consequence of the FFS scheme. Negotiations on shared savings will prove instrumental in coordinating the objectives and goals of all parties involved. An increase in the number of hospitalists may result from a transitioning delivery model and payment approach. 9 Physician practices will need to adjust as the shift is made from volume of services to value and quality outcomes.
Pricing and Risk Adjustment
Managing the division of shared financial risk between payers and providers poses a comprehensive challenge. 12 The price-setting balance is crucial because it shapes desired behaviors. If prices are set too low, providers may be forced to underutilize care or lose money, whereas a high price may reduce the motivation for providers to enhance process and supply efficiency. 8 Hospitals face less financial risk if bundled payments target high-cost variation within procedures (eg, joint replacement surgery). 8 To optimize the payment system for both payers and providers, 4 key elements were identified: (1) make outlier payments for the rare high-cost case, (2) include rewards or penalties based on outcomes of care, (3) require that essential services be delivered for payment to be received, and (4) publicly report quality measures. 8 In addition, risk-adjustment methodologies, similar to those proposed in the PROMETHEUS payment model, need to appropriately take evidence-based case rates into consideration. 14 
Organizational Structure
The PROMETHEUS study suggests that integrated delivery systems are best positioned to succeed with an episode-of-care-based payment model. 12 The degree of coordination between acute and postacute settings is demanding. A competitive advantage is apparent for those organizations that already have closed the gap. In addition to formal internal structural changes to providers and payers, a reorganization and strategy of referral networks is likely to follow. 8 Collaboration with participating postacute providers will strengthen relationships and, in parallel, demand regulatory oversight to ensure fair competition.
Financial Management System
In accordance with changes in structure, advancement in financial management systems is crucial. The hospital or health system (typically) receiving the bundled payments must have a mechanism to collect, allocate, and manage funds. Changes must be made in claims processing procedures to capture bundled payment-appropriate services versus the traditional FFS components. 12 A dedicated staff may be required to sustain operations. 6 Managing postacute and payer contracting is another function of the financial management system that is required to support reimbursement revision. 8 
Information Systems
A vital component of enhanced coordination is the use of information systems, such as electronic health records and computerized provider order entry. These systems ensure effective communication and coordination between stakeholders, enabling automation of processes, exchange of information, and increased access to and transparency of data. The continued adoption and implementation of information systems in provider settings will contribute to narrowing gaps in transitions between different groups.
Care Transitions
Care transitions are defined as the movement of a patient between different locations (eg, hospital to skilled nursing facility) or levels of care within the same location (eg, primary care to specialty care, ICU to step-down unit). 14, 15 Within the context of care transitions, patients experience many interactions with various providers (eg, physicians, pharmacists, nurses). As a critical component of successful care delivery, communication is key to effective transitions. The bundled payment models described earlier highlight the varying degrees of potential focus. It may be difficult for hospitals to effectively manage care coordination and influence postdischarge activities if these services occur outside of their institution. 8 These factors must be considered prior to implementing a bundled payment arrangement.
Evidence-Based Medicine and Clinical Variation
Standardizing clinical processes ensure a reduction in cost and improvement and consistency in outcomes. Leaders from prior bundle pilots advocated the use of evidencebased medicine to benchmark performance on selected DRGs. 9 Physician alignment, through financial incentives, will help promote efforts to incorporate evidence-based practices. In addition to DRG guideline-based management, the most recent Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care found that variation and frequency of physician consults accounted for a major portion of Medicare costs. 9 
Supply Cost Management
Similarly, supply expense (both equipment and drugs) reduction efforts are needed to stave off potential losses from inefficient operations and processes. Cost savings have been realized with implantable device procedures from various pilot programs. 9 Implementation of a bundled, risk-based payment system leads to a systemic transformation of internal and external operations, the need for new financial and information systems, better alignment of goals and objectives, and a paradigm shift from volume to value. The challenges and critical issues discussed highlight the need for careful consideration of significant components. To reinforce this point, Table 1 shows the potential gains or losses organizations face depending on their ability to reduce service and operational costs through coordination, support mechanisms, and strategic selection of DRG bundled payments and payment models.
Discussion and Conclusion
To improve outcomes and reduce costs, a reimbursement structure must be constructed to align incentives and promote coordination and accountability. Partnerships between providers, the community, and payers are critical to improve the health care delivery system. The focus on the care continuum requires providers to view themselves as participants in a series of activities that define the patient's episode of care. Organizations must remain agile and responsive to change. Changes in reimbursement will cause a systemic transformation in delivery, health care provider operations, and consumer perspectives. The paradigm shift from volume to value challenges providers, clinicians, and administrators to provide high-quality, safe, and effective care at lower and lower costs. Health care cost reductions can be achieved with added components such as pay for performance. 10 Implementation remains a complex hurdle.
An improved and better aligned payment system is a necessary but not sufficient step toward reforming health care because provider practice change and systemwide delivery integration is paramount. 8 Reforming the health care system will take a considerable amount of time and resources. 12 Change thus far has been slow and inconsistent; however, demonstration projects provide the opportunity for great progress to be made. Federal health information technology subsidies and support further enable organizations to prepare for and implement new payment methods. 9 A shared risk model alters the basic makeup of a fragmented system. The providers who are able to adapt to a changing environment and achieve cost reductions, improved outcomes, and a strong consumer and resource base will realize a sustained competitive advantage in the marketplace.
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